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Abstract
This paper introduces a natural deduction calculus for intuitionistic
logic of belief IEL− which is easily turned into a modal λ-calculus giving a
computational semantics for deductions in IEL−. By using that interpre-
tation, it is also proved that IEL− has good proof-theoretical properties.
The correspondence between deductions and typed terms is then extended
to a categorial semantics for identity of proofs in IEL− showing the general
structure of such a modality for belief in an intuitionistic framework.
Keywords: Intuitionistic modal logic, epistemic logic, categorial proof theory, modal type
theory, proofs-as-programs.
Introduction
Brouwer-Heyting-Kolgomorov (BHK) interpretation is based on a semantic
reading of propositional variables as problems (or tasks), and of logical connec-
tives as operations on proofs. In this way, it provides a semantics of mathemat-
ical statements in which the computational aspects of proving and refuting are
highlighted.1
In spite of being named after L.E.J. Brouwer, this approach is rather away
from the deeply philosophical attitude at the origin of intuitionism: In BHK
interpretation, reasoning intuitionistically is similar to a safe mode of program
execution which always terminates; on the contrary, according to the founders
of intuitionism, at the basis of the mathematical activity there is a continuous
mental process of construction of objects starting with the flow of time underly-
ing the chain of natural numbers, and intuitionistic reasoning is what structures
that process.2
This reading of the mathematical activity is formally captured by Kripke
semantics for intuitionistic logic [9]: Relational structures based on pre-orders
∗Main preliminary results were presented in May 2019 during the Logic and Philosophy of
Science Seminar at University of Florence (Italy). A refined presentation was given during the
poster session of The Proof Society Summer School at Swansea University (UK) on September
9th, 2019. The present version was submitted for publication to Studia Logica in January
2020.
1The reader is referred to [16] for an introduction.
2For instance, Dummett’s [6] advocates a purely philosophical justification of the whole
current of intuitionistic mathematics.
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capture the informal idea of a process of growth of knowledge in time which
characterises the mental life of the mathematician.
It is worth-noting that the focuses of these semantics are quite different:
BHK interpretation stresses the importance of the concept of proof in the seman-
tics for intuitionistic logic; Kripke’s approach highlights the epistemic process
behind the provability of a statement.
In [2], Artemov and Protopopescu make use of the BHK interpretation to
extend – in a sense – the epistemic realm of constructivism: In BHK interpreta-
tion we have an implicit notion of proof whose epistemic aspects are modelled by
Kripke structures; the construction of a proof for a specific proposition that we
carried out as a cumulative mental process gives us sufficient reason for (at least)
believing that proposition. It is then possible to cover also traditional epistemic
states of belief and knowledge within such a framework, once we recognise the
correct clauses for corresponding modal operators.
In [2] the starting point is thus a BHK interpretation of epistemic statements
in which knowledge and belief are considered as (different) results of a process of
verification. In spite of this, that paper covers only axiomatic calculi and Kripke
semantics for intuitionistic epistemic logics, so that the stimulating question of
considering the computational aspects of epistemic states remained informal
and at a very beginning stage.
The present paper, on the contrary, is committed to giving a precise, formal
analysis of the computational content of intuitionistic belief.
In order to establish some clear facts, a natural deduction system IEL−
for the intuitionistic logic of belief is developed and designed with the intent of
translating it into a functional calculus of IEL−-deductions. In a sense, we define
a formal counterpart of Artemov and Protopopescu’s reading of the epistemic
operator for belief by extending the Curry-Howard correspondence between intu-
itionistic natural deduction NJ and simple type theory, to a modal λ-calculus
in which the modal connective on propositions behaves according to a single
(term-)introduction rule.
Furthermore, we establish normalization for IEL−, and, in spite of its sim-
ple grammar, we show that there is a surprisingly rich categorial structure be-
hind the calculus: our λ-system for IEL−-deductions is sound and complete w.r.t.
the class of bi-cartesian closed categories equipped with a monoidal pointed end-
ofunctor whose point is monoidal.
Therefore, by adopting the proofs-as-programs paradigm to give a precise
meaning to the motto “belief-as-verification” we succeed in:
◦ Designing a natural deduction calculus IEL− for intuitionistic belief which
is well-behaved from a proof-theoretic point of view;
◦ Proving that this calculus corresponds to a modal typed system in which
every term has a unique normal form, and the epistemic modality acquires
a precise functional interpretation;
◦ Developing a categorial semantics for intuitionistic belief which focuses on
identity of proofs, and not simply on provability.
The paper is then organised as follows: In Section 1, the axiomatic calculus
IEL
− and its relational semantics are recalled. In Section 2, we introduce the
natural deduction system IEL− and prove – syntactically – that it is logically
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equivalent to IEL−; then we investigate its proof-theoretic properties, proving
that detours can be eliminated from deductions by defining a λ-calculus with
a modal operator which captures in a very natural way the behaviour of the
epistemic modality on propositions. Finally, in Section 3, we give a categorial
semantics for IEL−-deduction: After recalling the main lines of Curry-Howard-
Lambek correspondence, we prove that deductions define – up to normalization
– specific categorial structures which subsume Heyting algebras with operators
and, at the same time, provide a proof-theoretic semantics for intuitionistic
belief.
By means of these results we can also see that some claims in [2] concerning
a type-theoretic reading of the epistemic operator as the truncation of types are
not correct. The belief modality there defined is ‘weaker’ than inh : Type → Type
because of its type-theoretic – hence syntactic – behaviour, validated also from
a categorial – hence semantic – point of view: Types truncation equippes bi-
cartesian closed categories with an idempotent monad, while we show that the
belief operator we are considering is a more general functor.3
1. Axiomatic calculus for intuitionistic belief
Let’s start by recalling the syntax and relational semantics for the logic of
intuitionistic belief as introduced in [2].
1.1. System IEL−
Definition 1.1.1. IEL− is the axiomatic calculus given by:
• Axiom schemes for intuitionistic propositional logic;
• Axiom scheme K : ✷(A→ B)→ ✷A→ ✷B;
• Axiom scheme of co-reflection A→ ✷A;
• Modus Pones
A→ B A
MP
B
as the only inference rule.
We write Γ ⊢IEL− A when A is derivable in IEL
− assuming the set of hypotheses
Γ, and we write IEL− ⊢ A when Γ = ∅.
We immediately have
Proposition 1.1.2. The following properties hold:
(i) Necessitation rule
A
✷A
is derivable in IEL−;
(ii) The deduction theorem holds in IEL−;
(iii) IEL− is a normal intuitionistic modal system.
Proof. See [2]. ⊠
As stated before, this system axiomatizes the idea of belief as the result
of verification within a framework in which truth corresponds to provability,
accordingly to the Brower-Heyting-Kolgomorov interpretation of intuitionistic
logic.4 Note also that, in this perspective, the co-reflection scheme is valid, while
3In fact even when thought of as a modal connective of our base language, the epistemic
✷ is not an idempotent operator.
4See e.g. [18].
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its converse does not hold: If A is true, then it has a proof, hence it is verified;
but A can be verified without disclosing a specific proof, therefore the standard
epistemic scheme ✷A→ A is not valid under this interpretation.5
1.2. Kripke Semantics for IEL−
Turning to relational semantics, in [2] the following class of Kripke models
is given.
Definition 1.2.1. A model for IEL− is a quadruple 〈W,≤, v, E〉 where
◦ 〈W,≤, v〉 is a standard model for intuitionistic propositional logic;
◦ E is a binary ‘knowledge’ relation on W such that:
· if x ≤ y, then xEy; and
· if x ≤ y, then if yEz, xEz; graphically we have
y
E
// z
x
≤
??
⑧
⑧
⑧
⑧
⑧
⑧
⑧
⑧
E
77
◦ v extends to a forcing relation  such that
· x  ✷A iff y  A for all y such that xEy.
A formula A is true in a model iff it is forced by each world of that model; we
write IEL−  A iff A is true in each model for IEL−.
Note that this semantics assumes Kripke’s original interpretation of intu-
itionistic reasoning as a growing knowledge – or discovery process – for an epis-
temic agent in which the relation E defines an audit of ‘cognitively’ ≤-accessible
states in which the agent can commit a verification.
This semantics is adequate to the calculus:
Theorem 1.2.2. The following hold:
(Soundness) If IEL− ⊢ A, then IEL−  A.
(Completeness) If IEL−  A, then IEL− ⊢ A.
Proof. Soundness is proved by induction on the derivation of A.
Completeness is proved by a standard construction of a canonical model.
See [2] for the details. ⊠
5See Williamson’s system in [20] for an intuitionistic epistemic logic in which the standard
epistemic principle is valid; however it is worth noting that this specific logic is not based on
the BHK-semantics.
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2. Natural Deduction for intuitionistic belief
We want to develop a semantics of proofs for the logic of intuitionistic be-
lief. In order to do that, we now introduce a natural deduction system which
is logically equivalent to IEL−, but which is also capable of a computational
reading of the epistemic operator and of proofs involving this kind of modality.
Accordingly, the starting point is proving that the calculus IEL− of natural
deduction is sound and complete w.r.t. IEL−; then, we prove that proofs in
IEL
− can be named by means of λ-terms as stated in the proofs-as-programs
paradigm for intuitionistic logic also known as Curry-Howard correspondence.
By using this formalism, we prove a normalization theorem for IEL− stating
that detours can be eliminated from all deductions.
In the next section, we extend such a correspondence to category theory for
showing the underlying structure of the operator for intuitionistic belief.
2.1. System IEL−
Definition 2.1.1. Let IEL− be the calculus extending the propositional frag-
ment of NJ – the natural deduction calculus for intuitionistic logic6 – by the
following rule:
Γ1
...
✷A1 · · ·
Γn
...
✷An
[A1, · · · , An],∆
...
B
✷−intro
✷B
where Γ and ∆ are sets of occurrences of formulae, and all A1, · · · , An are
discharged.7
Let’s immediately check that we are dealing with the same logic:
Lemma 2.1.2. Γ ⊢IEL− A iff Γ ⊢IEL− A.
Proof. Assume Γ ⊢IEL− A. We proceed by induction on the derivation.
• Intuitionistic cases are dealt with NJ propositional rules;
• K:
✷(A→ B) ✷A
[A→ B,A]
...
B
✷−intro
✷B
;
• co-reflection:
[A]1
✷−intro
✷A
→−intro:1
A→ ✷A
.
6See [17] for an introduction.
7This calculus differs from the system introduced in [5] by allowing the set ∆ of additional
hypotheses is the subdeduction of B. A different calculus, considering the original ✷-intro
rule in [5] and a further rule
Γ ⊢ A
Γ ⊢ ✷A
, even though more symmetric, seems to lack some
important computational properties, like uniqueness of normal proofs.
5
Conversely, assume Γ ⊢IEL− A. We consider only the ✷-intro rule:
By induction hypothesis, we have Γ1 ⊢IEL− ✷A1, · · · , Γn ⊢IEL− ✷An, and
A1, · · · , An,∆ ⊢IEL− B. Then we have Γ1, · · · ,Γn ⊢IEL− ✷A1, · · · ,✷An,
and, by the deduction theorem for IEL− and ordinary logic,
∆ ⊢IEL− A1 ∧ · · · ∧An → B.
By co-reflection IEL− ⊢ (A1 ∧ · · · ∧An → B)→ ✷(A1 ∧ · · · ∧An → B), and
by K-scheme IEL− ⊢ ✷(A1 ∧ · · · ∧An → B)→ ✷(A1 ∧ · · · ∧An)→ ✷B. Hence
we have ∆ ⊢IEL− ✷(A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An) → ✷B, whence, by modal logic, we obtain
∆ ⊢IEL− ✷A1 ∧ · · · ∧ ✷An → ✷B, which gives Γ1, · · · ,Γn,∆ ⊢IEL− ✷B, as
desired. ⊠
2.2. Normalization
In order to eliminate potential detours from IEL−-deduction we introduce
the following proof rewritings:
(ι)
Γ
...
✷A [A]
✷−intro
✷A
❀
Γ
...
✷A
(δ)
Γ
...
~✷A
[ ~A]1, ~C
...
B
✷−intro:1
✷B
∆
...
~✷D
[B, ~D]2, ~E
...
F
✷−intro:2
✷F
❀
Γ
...
~✷A
∆
...
~✷D
[ ~A]1
...
B ~C, [ ~D]1, ~E
...
F
✷−intro:1
✷F
Note that (ι) eliminates a useless application of ✷-intro, while (δ) collapses two
✷-intros into a single one.
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Remark 1 (Proofs-as-programs). Curry-Howard correspondence permits a func-
tional reading of proofs in NJ, once one recognises the following mapping:
f ≡ A 7−→ xAi , where i is the parcel of the
hypothesis A
f ≡
f1
A
f2
B
A ∧ B
7−→ 〈tA, sB〉, where tA, sB correspond
to f1 and f2 resp.
f ≡
f ′
A ∧ B
A
7−→ pi1.t
A×B , where tA×B corresponds
to f ′
f ≡
f ′
A ∧ B
B
7−→ pi2.t
A×B , where tA×B corresponds
to f ′
f ≡
f ′
B
A→ B
7−→ λxAi .t
B , where tB corresponds to
f ′ and i is the parcel of
discharged hypotheses A
f ≡
f1
A→ B
f2
A
B
7−→ tA→BsA, where tA→B, sA corre-
spond to f1 and f2 resp.
f ≡
f ′
A
A ∨ B
7−→ in1.t
A, where tA corresponds to
f ′
f ≡
f ′
B
A ∨ B
7−→ in2.s
B , where sB corresponds to
f ′
f ≡ f
′
A ∨ B
[A]
..
.
C
[B]
..
.
C
C
7−→ C(t, (xA.t1), (y
B .t2)) where C bounds all oc-
currences of x in t1 and
all occurrences of y in t2,
and t, t1, t2 correspond to
f ′, the subdeduction of C
from A, and the subde-
duction of C from B, resp.
f ≡
f ′
⊥
A
7−→ EAt where t corresponds to f
′
f ≡
f ′
A
⊤
7−→ (Ut) where t correspond to f ′.
By imposing specific rewritings we obtain the complete engine of λ-calculus
associated to the propositional fragment of NJ.8
Since IEL− consists also of rules for ✷, we need to extend the grammar of
such a typed λ-calculus as follows:
T ::= 1 | 0 | p | A→ B | A×B | A+B | ✷A
8See [7] for a clear introduction to the topic.
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t ::= x | E(t) | U(t) | λx : A.t : B | t1t2 | (t1, t2) | π1(t) | π2(t) |
in1(a : A) | in2(b : B) | C(t, x.t1, y.t2) |
box[~x : ~A|~z].~t : ~✷A in (s : B) : ✷B .
As for NJ, a modal λ-calculus is obtained by decorating IEL−-deductions with
proof names. Proof rewritings can be then expressed by imposing appropriate
reductions of λ-terms:
box[x].t in x >ι t
box[x1, · · · , xi−1, xi, xi+1, · · · , xn|~z].(t1, · · · , ti−1, (box[~y|~w].~s in ti) in r >δ
>δ box[x1, · · · , xi−1, ~y, xi+1, · · · , xn|~z, ~w].(t1, · · · , ti−1, ~s, ti+1, · · · , tn) in r[ti/xi]
Assuming this reading of deductions as programs, normalization now be-
comes just the execution of a program written in our modal λ-calculus; nor-
malization then assures consistency of IEL−, its analyticity, and hence its de-
cidability. However, the quest for normalizing natural deduction systems is not
limited to the proofs-as-programs paradigm, and its origins are actually at the
very core of proof theory: We refer the reader to [12] and [19] for the technical
and historical aspects of the research field, respectively.
We write ✄ for the transitive closure of the relation obtained by combining
>ι and >δ. An algebra of λ-terms is then obtained by considering the reflexive,
symmetric, transitive closure
✷
= of ✄, i.e. by combining the reflexive, symmetric,
transitive closure
ι
= and
δ
= of >ι and >δ, respectively.
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We can now prove that every deduction in IEL− can be uniquely reduced to
a proof containing no detours.
Theorem 2.2.1. Strong normalization holds for IEL−.
Proof. We define a translation10 | − | from the λ-calculus of IEL−-deductions to
typed λ-calculus with products, sums, empty and unit types:
|0| := 0
|1| := 1
|p| := p
|A→ B| := |A| → |B|
|A×B| := |A| × |B|
|A+B| := |A|+ |B|
|✷A| := (|A| → q)→ q
9Note that
ι
= is just a special case of
δ
=. We decide to adopt this redundant system of
rewriting since
ι
= has a straightforward interpretation in category theory: see Section 3.2.
10This function is introduced in [8] to prove detour-elimination for the implicational frag-
ment of basic intuitionistic modal logic IK by reducing the problem to normalization of simple
type theory. Here we adopt the mapping to consider also product, co-product, empty, and unit
types, keeping the original strategy due to [4]. A different proof based on Tait’s computability
method [15] should also be possible and is under development by the author.
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|x| := x
|c| := c
|E(t)| := E(|t|)
|U(t)| := U(|t|)
|λx t| := λx.|t|
|ts| := |t||s|
|(t, s)| := (|t|, |s|)
|πi(t)| := πi(|t|)
|C(t, x.t1, y.t2)| := C(|t|, x.|t1|, y.|t2|)
|ini(t)| := ini(|t|)
|box[x1, · · · , xn|~z].(t1, · · · , tn) in s| := λk.|t1|(λx1. · · · |tn|(λxn. k|s|) · · · )
where q is specific atom type. Then it is easy to see that
✷
= is preserved by
this mapping.11 Therefore, since typed λ-calculus with products, sums, empty
and unit types is strongly normalizing,12 so is our modal λ-calculus, and IEL−
also13. ⊠
Lemma 2.2.2. The modal λ-calculus of IEL−-deductions has the Church-Rosser
property.
Proof. It is straightforward to prove weak Church-Rosser property for our cal-
culus. By Theorem 2.2.1, the modal λ-calculus of IEL−-deductions has the
Church-Rosser property.14 ⊠
Corollary 2.2.3. Every IEL−-deduction reduces uniquely to a deduction without
detours.
Proof. By Theorem 2.2.1 and Lemma 2.2.2, any term of the modal λ-calculus
of IEL−-deductions has a unique normal form. ⊠
3. Categorial Semantics for intuitionistic belief
If λ-calculus gives a computational semantics of proofs in NJ – and, as we
showed in the previous section, in IEL− also – category theory furnishes the tools
for an ‘algebraic’ semantics which is proof relevant – i.e. contrary to traditional
algebraic semantics based on Heyting algebras and to relational semantics based
on Kripke models, it focuses on the very notion of proof, distinguishing between
different deductions of the same formula.
In this perspective, the correspondence between proofs and programs is ex-
tended to consider arrows in categories which have enough structure to capture
the behaviour of logical operators. The so-called Curry-Howard-Lambek corre-
spondence can be then summarized by the following table
11This means that if t ✄ t′ in one step, then |t| >> |t′|, where >> indicates the usual
βη-reductions with permutations.
12See [7] and [1].
13In other terms, if IEL− was not normalizing, then we would have an infinite ✄-reduction
starting from, say, t : A. By the previous note, this would lead to an infinite >>-reduction
starting from |t| : |A|, contradicting strong normalization of typed λ-calculus with ×,+, 1, 0.
14See [14] for the general result relating strong normalization and Church-Rosser theorem.
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Logic Type Theory Category Theory
proposition type object
proof term arrow
theorem inhabitant element-arrow
conjunction product type product
true unit type terminal object
implication function type exponential
disjunction sum type coproduct
false empty type initial object
Here we see that cartesian product models conjunction, and exponential models
implication. Any category having products and exponentials for any of its ob-
jects is called cartesian closed (CCCat); moreover, if it has also coproducts
– modelling disjunction – it is called bi-cartesian closed (bi-CCCat).15 The
reader is referred to the classic [10] for the details of such completeness result.
For our calculus, in order to capture the behaviour of the epistemic modality,
some more structure is required: In the following subsections some basic defi-
nitions are recalled and then used to provide IEL− with an adequate categorial
semantics.
3.1. Monoidal Functors, Pointed Functors, and Monoidal Natural
Transformations
Definition 3.1.1. Given a CCCat C, an endofunctor F : C → C is monoidal
when
• there exists a natural transformation
mA,B : FA× FB → F(A×B);
• there exists a morphism
m1 : 1 → F1,
preserving the monoidal structure of C.16
These are called structure morphisms of F.
It is quite easy to see that a monoidal endofunctor on the category of logical
formulas induces a modal operator satisfying K-scheme, as proved in [5].
Definition 3.1.2. Given any category C, an endofunctor F : C → C is pointed
iff there exists a natural transformation
π : IdC ⇒ F
πA : A→ FA
A
piA
//
f

FA
Ff

B
piB
// FB
π is called the point of F.
15⊤ and ⊥ correspond to empty product – the terminal object 1 – and empty coproduct
– the initial object 0.
16See [11] for the corresponding commuting diagrams and the definition of monoidal cate-
gory.
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In the present setting, a pointed endofunctor on the category of logical for-
mulas ‘represents’ the co-reflection scheme.
Since we want to give a semantics of proofs – and not simply of derivability
– in IEL−, we need a further notion from category theory.
Definition 3.1.3. Given a monoidal category C, and monoidal endofunctors
F,G : C → C, a natural transformation κ : F ⇒ G is monoidal when the
following commute:
FA× FB
κA×κB

mF
A,B
// F(A×B)
κA×B

GA×GB
mGA,B
// G(A×B)
and
1
mF
1
// F(1)
κ1

1
mG
1
// G(1)
3.2. Categorial Completeness
Finally, we introduce the models by which we want to capture IEL−.
Definition 3.2.1. An IEL−-category is given by a bi-CCCat C together with a
monoidal pointed endofunctor K whose point κ is monoidal.
Now we can check adequacy of these models.
Theorem 3.2.2 (Soundness). Let C be an IEL−-category. Then there is a
canonical interpretation J−K of IEL− in C such that
◦ a formula A is mapped to a C-object JAK;
◦ a deduction t of A1, · · · , An ⊢IEL− B is mapped to an arrow
JtK : JA1K× · · · × JAnK → JBK;
◦ for any two deductions t and s which are equal modulo
✷
=, we have
JtK = JsK.
Proof. By structural induction on f : ~A ⊢IEL− B. The intuitionistic cases are
interpreted according to the remarks about CCCats at the beginning of this
section. We overload the notation using 〈✷,m, κ〉 for the monoidal pointed
endofunctor of C, its structure morphisms, and its point.
The deduction
f1 : Γ1 ⊢ ✷A1 · · · fn : Γn ⊢ ✷An g : [A1, · · · , An], C1, · · · , Cm ⊢ B
✷B
is mapped to
(✷JgK) ◦mJA1K,··· ,JAnK,JC1K,··· ,JCmK ◦ Jf1K× · · · × JfnK× κJC1K × · · · × κJCmK,
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where mX1,··· ,Xn is defined inductively as
mX1,··· ,Xn−1,Xn := mX1×···×Xn−1,Xn ◦ (mX1,··· ,Xn−1)× id✷Xn .
It is straightforward to check that the categorification of
ι
= holds by functo-
riality of ✷.
The relation
δ
= is also valid by naturality ofm and κ: The reader is invited to
check that κ must be monoidal in order to model correctly the following special
case17
Γ1
...
A1
✷−intro
✷A1 · · ·
Γn
...
An
✷−intro
✷An
[A1, · · · , An]
1, C1, · · · , Cm
...
B
✷−intro:1
✷B
❀
❀
Γ1
...
A1
· · ·
· · ·
Γn
...
An C1, · · · , Cm
...
B
✷−intro
✷B
.
⊠
It remains to show that this interpretation is also complete.
Theorem 3.2.3 (Completeness). If the interpretation of two IEL−-deductions
is equal in all IEL−-categories, then the two deductions are equal modulo
✷
=.
Proof. We proceed by constructing a term model for the modal λ-calculus for
IEL
−-deductions. Consider the following category M:
• its objects are formulae;
• an arrow f : A→ B is an IEL−-deduction of B from A;
• identities are given by assuming a hypothesis;
• composition is given by transitivity of deductions.
Then M has a bi-cartesian closed structure given by the properties of con-
junction, implication, and disjunction in NJ.
Moreover, the modal operator ✷ induces a functor K by mapping A to ✷A,
and
A1, · · · , An
...
B
7→
✷(A1 ∧ · · · ∧An)
[A1 ∧ · · · ∧An]
...
B
✷−intro
✷B
17Everything reduces to long categorial calculations.
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which preserves identities by
ι
= , and preserves composition as a special case
of
δ
=.
The structure morphism is given by
✷A ∧ ✷B
✷A
✷A ∧ ✷B
✷B
[A] [B]
A ∧B
✷(A ∧B)
whose properties follow as a special case of
δ
=.
The point is given by
A
✷A
and its characteristic property is given as a
special case of
δ
=. Finally such a point is monoidal by
δ
= up to ∧-detours.
Then if an equation between interpreted IEL−-deductions holds in all IEL−-
categories, then it holds also in M, so that those deductions are equal w.r.t.
✷
=.
⊠
Remark 2 (Belief and truncation). In [3], truncation – there called “bracket
types” – is defined in a first order calculus with types, and showed to behave like
a monad. Similarly, in [13], (n-)truncation is defined as a monadic idempotent
modality within the framework of homotopy type theory.
We have just seen that despite the truncation does eliminate all compu-
tational significance to an inhabitant of a type – turning then a proof of a
proposition into a simple verification of that statement – the belief modality
defined in [2] does not correspond to that operator on types.
Actually, after considering the potential applications of IEL(−) prospected
by Artemov and Protopopescu outside the realm of mathematical statements,
that should be not surprising at all: The categorial semantics of IEL−-deductions
subsumes the interpretation of truncation as an idempotent monad, since such
a functor is just a special case of monoidal pointed endofunctor with monoidal
point.
It might be interesting thus to consider the relationship between truncation
and the belief modality from a purely syntactic perspective, by comparing the
structural properties of a potential simple type theory with bracket types and
our modal λ-calculus for intuitionistic belief.18
Conclusion
Our original intent has been to make precise the computational significance
of the motto “belief-as-verification” which leads in [2] to the introduction of
epistemic modalities in the framework of BHK interpretation. In particular,
despite some claims contained in that paper, we were not sure how to relate the
belief operator with type truncation.
In the present paper, we have addressed these questions and have developed a
‘proof-theoretically tractable’ system for intuitionistic belief that can be easily
turned into a modal λ-calculus, showing that the epistemic operator behaves
differently from truncation.
18As stated before, truncation has been considered only in a first-order context – i.e. work-
ing within dependent types. It should be possible, however, to define truncation for simple
types by imposing further reductions to terms of the system mimicking the rules involving
(intensional) equality in bracketed types.
13
Moreover, by extending some results concerning categorial semantics for the
basic intuitionistic modal logic IK in [5] and [8], we developed a proof-theoretic
semantics for intuitionistic belief based on monoidal pointed endofunctors with
monoidal points on bi-CCCats. Even from this ‘structural’ perspective, the
modal operator differs from type-theoretic truncation, so that the reading of
belief as the result of verification seems to be just a heuristic interpretation of
that specific modality.
Having established so, some general questions naturally arise:
• how could be the original motivation of co-reflection scheme A → ✷A –
i.e. the interpretation of ✷ as a verification operator on propositions –
correctly captured, from a computational point of view, by intuitionistic
logic of belief?
• does the possible extension IEL of IEL− obtained by adding the elimination
rule
Γ ⊢ ✷A
Γ ⊢ ¬¬A
recover the intuitionistic reading of epistemic states as
results of verification in a formal way – i.e. as type-theoretic truncation?
In our opinion, these problems are strongly related: In fact, it seems plausible
that the additional elimination rule provides IEL with an adjunction between ✷
and ¬¬ which has still to be checked and deserves a fine grained analysis and
comparison with type truncation.
Moreover, it might be interesting to consider similar modalities in different
settings, including first order logic and linear logics.
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